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ABSTRACT
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), alternatively the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), is one of many non-state organizations that resulted from the
extensive foreign intervention in the Middle East leading up to current conflicts there.
Like the wider network that it used to be part of, ISIL is considered to be a great threat
to modern first world countries. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),
this paper analyzed the relationship between the amount of territory ISIL held from June
2014 to December 2015 and the attacks it carried out in that time, using Standard
Deviational Ellipses to analyze directional orientation and distribution density of the
attacks. The results showed that there was a slight correlation between significant land
loss and increases in attacks in the following quarter.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
ISIL was founded in 1999 under the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (The
Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) under the leadership of Jordanian Sunni radical,
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Cheterian, 2015). Soon after, the group pledged themselves to
the larger al-Qaeda terror network and took part in the fighting during the month-long
Iraq War in 2003 and the 2011 Syrian Civil War, though they were only considered a
serious threat in the latter conflict. Eleven years from their inception, a new leader, Abu
Omar al-Baghdadi, changed the group’s name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, and later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, though the names tend to be used
interchangeably. The leaders of al-Qaeda and various other members of the network
cut ties completely with ISIL by February 2014 due to al-Baghdadi’s attempts to
consolidate power under himself (Celso, 2015). During and following this dispute, ISIL
carried out their Anbar Campaign, seizing control of Mosul and perpetrating the Sinjar
Massacre. This offensive action sparked a renewal of US military operations in Iraq.
In June 2014, al-Baghdadi declared the beginning of a new caliphate, with
himself as its Emir, and sought to turn ISIL’s territory into an actual state, which at the
time consisted of holdings in northwest Iraq and northeast Syria (Celso, 2015). To be
brief, ISIL’s state aspirations were rejected by world governments as well as moderate
Muslims, both Sunni and Shi’ite. Since then, ISIL has been opposed by government
forces of both Iraq and Syria and even other non-state militias such as the Kurds and alQaeda (Celso, 2015).
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Figure 1: Countries Attacked by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 2014-2015
Created by Author on November 11, 2016.

Based on data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016), ISIL carried out 2110
attacks in 12 countries between June 2014 and December 2015, including Iraq, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, the Gaza Strip, Tunisia, Somalia, Egypt,
Bahrain, and France (See Figure 1). However, Figure 1 only makes ISIL seem like it
has a farther spatial reach than the organization actually possesses. Instead, the
majority of these attacks took place in Iraq (See Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Division of Attacks by Country
Created by Author on October 28, 2016.

In total, these attacks resulted in 16,801 deaths and 11,408 injured (National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). While data
on previous attacks by ISIL was available from the GTD, the dataset used covered the
time after their official ties with al-Qaeda were severed. Figures 3 and 4 show the
breakdown of the casualties by year and quarter. Despite the observed period during
2014 being shorter by five months, the number of fatalities remained close to the same
as the following year. Of the seven quarters observed, Quarters 2 and 3 2014 had the
highest lethality and subsequent quarters were less lethal.
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Figure 3: Casualties From ISIL Attacks World-Wide 2014-2015
Created by Author on October 28, 2016.

Figure 4: Casualties From ISIL Attacks By Quarter 2014-2015
Created by Author on October 28, 2016.

During this time, ISIL has utilized a variety of methods of attack, though the most
common has been bombing (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, 2016). In 2014, 501 attacks were bombings, approximately

4

50% of all attacks (See Figure 5). In 2015, this number increased by nearly 50% to 771
incidents (See Figure 5). The difference could be attributed to the length of the
observed periods of each year, as 2014 was only observed for seven months.
Interestingly, the increase in bombings appears to be inversely proportional to fatalities
in 2015, save for a spike in Quarter 2 2015. The targets of these attacks have primarily
been private citizens and property and military personnel (National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). In 2015, attacks on private
citizens increased by close to 30% and attacks against military personnel nearly
doubled (See Figure 6).

Figure 5: Attack Types 2014-2015
Created by Author on October 28, 2016.
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Figure 6: Targets of Attack World-Wide 2014-2015
Created by Author on October 28, 2016

By the end of June 2014, ISIL controlled (either psychologically or
physically) territory in two countries as a result of the Anbar Campaign (See Figure 7).
In Iraq, ISIL controlled or operated in most of the northern Tigris river area and a portion
of the Euphrates, which included (but was not limited to) the cities of Mosul, Tall Afar,
Tikrit, Abu Kamal, and Rawah, with additional small pockets to the north and to the west
of Baghdad (See Figure 7). In Syria, ISIL held influence over most of the Euphrates
River, which included (but is not limited to) the cities of Manbij, Bab, as-Safirah, atTawrah, and ar-Raqqah (See Figure 7).
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Figure 7: ISIS Actual Sanctuary Map: June 2014

Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on
June 23, 2014]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-june-23-2014

This information prompts a line of questioning: (1) Is there a relationship between
the amount of territory ISIL controls and the spatial spread of their activities? (2) Do
changes in the size of ISIL’s territory affect the total number of attacks that they can
carry out on a quarterly basis?
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Studying Terrorism
The word “terrorism” is defined by the Merriam-Webster web dictionary as “the
use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a
political goal” or “the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion”
(Merriam-Webster, 2016). The word itself stems from the French word terrorisme, which
referred to “state terrorism” practiced during the Jacobian “Reign of Terror” in the 1790s
following the French Revolution. While terrorism is not a new tactic or subject of study,
the study of terrorism did not gain prominence until the 1970s during the various
conflicts in the Middle East and after the September 11, 2001 attack against the United
States, which sparked the interest of academics in multiple fields and led to a surge in
the publication of works on the subject (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014). One of the issues with
researching terrorism is defining what constitutes it, as there is no consensus on what
defines terrorism (Roberts, 2015). Terrorism has come to be associated with guerrilla
warfare carried out by non-state entities, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, with the purpose of
crippling morale by attacking civilian targets. However, operations carried out by
government agencies can also be classified as terrorism, referred to as state terrorism.
The infamous Nacht der langen Messer (Night of the Long Knives) is one such example
that could be considered an act of state-sponsored terrorism. This paper only
references non-state sponsored terrorism.
While incidents that qualify as terrorist attacks by the modern interpretation have
occurred for centuries, perpetrated by individuals or small groups, there have not been
8

large organized non-state entities to study until the emergence of the al-Qaeda network.
Different disciplines have different questions to ask and differing methods to gather
answers to them. However, there is a common question: How effective is terrorism?
The effectiveness of terror tactics is debatable. One argument poses that it is a rational
tactic to encourage more such acts and to accomplish political goals. The opposing idea
is that terror tactics are actually ineffective, as they cause the very people that the
perpetrators are trying to convince to be hardened against their ideals because of their
willingness to use acts such as suicide bombing. In between these two, there are
scholars that say that the effectiveness of terror tactics is a case by case basis
(Crenshaw 2014). The effectiveness debate is compounded due to the lack of
agreement about what constitutes a terrorist attack (Sánchez-Cuenca 2014). What
differentiates a terrorist bombing from a case of arson? Are attacks against civilian
targets the only ones counted as terrorist attacks, or do military targets count as well
(Plümper & Neumayer, 2010)?
Due to the relative scarcity of terrorism studies before the events of 9/11, a
structure of study was not truly established. Early research into the subject attempted to
use the same parameters used to study interstate wars, such as analyzing the
connections between the warring states. However, this methodology did not apply well
to the transnational nature of modern terrorist organizations (Young & Findley, 2011).
Looking at the causes, the characteristics, and means of operations were similarly
ineffective, so attention was turned towards how similar movements ended. Theories
posited that typically, such movements either succeed at their goal, potentially
becoming a legitimate political entity, or they are crushed by government action. In
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reality, the latter has a high tendency to fail and backfire. What is far more likely is that
the movement escalates their extremism and overreaches to the point where operation
is no longer tenable and collapses from lack of support. The fact that has not happened
to al-Qaeda in the 20 years of its existence led some to believe that they were unique in
this regard (Crenshaw, 2014).
Research into terrorism can point out no singular cause for the phenomenon.
Wealth is not a decisive reason, and only means that they can accomplish more. AlQaeda leader Osama bin Laden (1957-2011) was from a very wealthy Saudi Arabian
family before becoming involved in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and later
channeled his family’s funds into the terrorist network. Other terrorists were poor and
desperate, similar to the German people under the nascent Nazi regime during the late
1930s. The majority of terrorists originate from financially poor areas (Erdem &
Özdemir, 2009). Still others are fanatics, desiring to enforce their views on the rest of
the world. The only common factor that could be attributed to terrorism is that on some
level they are all displeased with some aspect of their society, whether something has
or has not changed, and feel that the status quo cannot be altered without violence
(Erdem & Özdemir, 2009).
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Al-Qaeda, the “parent” organization of ISIL, was founded in 1988 in response to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was seen by extremists as an attack against
Muslim culture. The invasion itself was one of the series of proxy wars between the
Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. Many of the members that
would make up Al-Qaeda later on were part of Operation Cyclone, an endeavor on the
10

part of the Central Intelligence Agency to train and fund local forces to fight against the
Soviets. The primary founder of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Ladin, was a Saudi Arabian
veteran of the conflict. Unlike ISIL, Al-Qaeda is not a centralized organization, but rather
spread out into cells, allowing them to have a much farther reach than ISIL as well as
being more difficult to root out. The organization had been in place and active in multiple
countries for years before the 9/11 terror attacks (Cheterian, 2015).
Much of the current research on ISIL is based in political science and sociology,
similarly to early research on al-Qaeda, examining their ideology and origins.
Established in 1999 by Jordanian radical Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, the organization was,
at its inception, one of the more extreme jihadi groups that established themselves in
northern Iraq. While he announced his allegiance to al-Qaeda in October 2004, alZarqawi never put himself under their command, using the name to gather recruits from
abroad (Cheterian, 2015. 110). Al-Zarqawi would be killed in an airstrike in 2006 and his
organization, at the time named Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, would fall by the wayside
despite his successor’s efforts. By 2009, ISIL was “dismissed as a dysfunctional and
failed organization” until the Syrian Civil War in 2013 (Celso, 2015. 21). The war
provided thousands of new recruits from both Syria and abroad, swelling ISIL’s ranks.
The treatment of Sunni Muslims by Shi’ite political figures in Iraq also provided a larger
pool of recruitment. This rapid buildup, combined with the withdrawal of United States
forces from Iraq, enabled the Anbar campaign that resulted in ISIL’s capture of the
northern provinces of Iraq in early 2014 (Celso, 2015).
ISIL’s stated intentions are very different from the network they once claimed
allegiance to. Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIL showed interest in conquering and holding
11

territories early on. They attempt to enforce sharia law in the territory they rule,
something which has continued to the present. While much of the world considers ISIL
a non-state militia, they see themselves as a state power. Walt (2015) compares ISIL to
revolutionary forces in past civil wars, citing examples such as the Bolsheviks or the
Khmer Rouge. While ISIL certainly has religious origins and goals, scholars such as
Brown (2015) and Gunter (2015) show that their actions are more geared towards the
sectarian conflict in Iraq and Syria. Gunter (2015) focuses on the ongoing conflict
between ISIL and the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, and Turkey and the political ramifications on
the region. Brown (2015) compared ISIL’s actions to that of al-Qaeda, showing that
despite ISIL’s stated intentions, they are either unable or unwilling to practice the same
global-scale jihad that al-Qaeda carried out. Despite carrying out attacks in France and
Belgium, most of ISIL’s activities have been in Iraq and Syria.
The conflicts against al-Qaeda, ISIL, and other non-state actors in the conflicts in
the Middle East have required changes to international law due to their transnational
nature (Schar, 2016). Before 9/11, most international laws only applied to state powers,
which prevented the unlawful invasion of sovereign territories to combat non-state
actors operating within their borders. These laws can be circumvented if the state in
question has been proven to provide support to the non-state entity. The war against alQaeda proved that such groups were willing to cross borders, requiring international law
to be reinterpreted. The bombing campaigns against ISIL in 2014 were interpreted as
“humanitarian interventions” by several countries to save more lives due to the Assad
regime’s lack of action (Schar, 2016).
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Plümper and Neumayer (2010) tested a hypothesis where they theorized that the
stronger a country’s ally was militarily and economically, the more likely it was that they
would be targeted by terrorist activities. They confirmed their hypothesis by concluding
that the stronger the allied nation was and the higher the democracy level, the greater
the risk of a terrorist attack directed against them. They also found that the risk
increased for nations that were geographically closer. While the United States did not
start out as allied with Iraq’s government, it can fulfill the first criteria in regards to the
conflicts against al-Qaeda and ISIL. White, Porter, and Mazerolle (2013) used a similar,
though expanded, methodology when they modeled terrorist activity in Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, looking for patterns between 2000 and 2010, though they did
not study a particular group. They used three variables as the basis of this study: risk,
resilience, and volatility. They concluded that Indonesia and the Philippines showed a
steady decrease in risk from the peak at the beginning of the study period, despite a
sudden spike in 2008 for the latter case. Thailand, on the other hand, had more
fluctuations over the study period, despite having a lower baseline risk than the other
two countries. While Indonesia and the Philippines had a greater risk, Thailand had
greater volatility. The latter study potentially proves the conclusion of Gao, Guo, Liao,
Webb, and Cutter (2013) that proximity to a nation that has already been attacked
increases the chances of attacks in neighboring countries due to the relative closeness
of the three nations observed, the Philippines and Indonesia in particular. This situation
bears a resemblance to the one in the Middle East. Syria, Iraq, and Iran are
geographically closer together, allowing terrorist groups to cross borders relatively
easily.
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Contributions of Geography
Geographical Information Systems have gained prominence in the field of
terrorism study, allowing for efficient visualization and analysis of trends. Many
researchers use GIS programs to analyze spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal trends,
such as in the study of crime science and disease spread. Much in the same way that
climate change can be predicted by documenting weather patterns, quantitative studies
of terrorism watch for clusters of attacks over a set period of time, from which patterns
can be found. Medina, Siebeneck, and Hepner (2011) utilized GIS to analyze spatiotemporal patterns in terrorist attacks in Iraq. Using data collected from the U.S. National
Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), they
performed analyses for six month periods between 2004 and 2009. They concluded that
there was a strong correlation between the number of attacks and the population count,
and the number of attacks and population density, but no correlation between
population or population density and attack intensity. The similarities between crime
analysis and terrorism study are close enough that the same methods can be applied to
both. Gao et al. (2013) utilized spatial auto-correlation, space-time clustering analyses,
and hot spot detection to identify and analyze clusters. The coordinates of each terror
incident were geocoded and analyzed by a space-time prospective analysis program
called SaTScan to detect clusters and enable the researchers to focus on clusters with
a high rate of terrorist activity. The researchers created “life trajectories” out of these
clusters to display potential future patterns of growth for analysis. The results showed
several patterns, one of which was a contagion effect based on proximity. The closer a
country was to one that suffered an attack, the more likely it was to be attacked as well.
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The mean is simply a single number that indicates a center in the data. With a
map, the spatial mean is indicated by the mean x and y coordinates taken from the data
and applied to a two-dimensional image. Standard Deviation is the measure of how
many degrees of magnitude away from the center a given number in the data is. The
first standard deviation away from the mean contains approximately 68.2% of all the
scores, followed by 95.4% and 99.6% for the next two. In geography, the standard
deviation circle is the same principle applied to a two-dimensional image to measure the
spread of data. However, a standard deviation circle is only effective when the data is
normally distributed. When the data is not normally distributed, a variant of the standard
deviational circle is used: the Standard Deviational Ellipse (SDE). Coined by D. Welty
Lefever in 1926 (Lefever, 1926), this measure of dispersion utilizes only the mean and
standard deviation in its equations to first determine a center point, or mean center,
upon which the ellipse would rotate, followed by calculating the curve to find the ellipse.
The shape of the ellipse, according to Lefever, was “a function of the calculated
standard deviation and the angle Ɵ between the two axes” (Lefever, 1926. 90). The
orientation of the resulting ellipse was based off a line of best fit and concentration was
measured by the ratio of points within the ellipse. The SDE has become an extremely
versatile tool in GIS due to its ability to overcome issues associated with anisotrophic
terrain by being able to detect potential relationships with a physical feature (Wang, B.,
2015). While standard deviational ellipses can be used on their own for analysis, they
often serve as the base for higher level analyses (Wang, Shi, and Miao, 2015), such as
determining directional orientation or distribution density of geographical units (Gong,
2002).
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The Standard Deviational Ellipse is based on three factors: the angle of rotation
along the Cartesian coordinate system, the deviation along the major axis (x-axis), and
the deviation along the minor axis (y-axis) (Wong and Lee, 2005). As such, it has not
changed since Lefever coined the term, save for the calculations becoming more
precise. Unlike the Standard Deviation Circle, the SDE can compensate for deviations
in direction, indicated visually by the orientation of the ends of the major axis of the
ellipse. Often, the distribution of points will also show linear patterns coinciding with
geographical features or man-made structures, such as rivers or roads. The ellipse will
become more circular if the data is closer to being normally distributed, and it becomes
more elliptical if it is not normally distributed. Otherwise, an SDE operates on the same
principles as a Standard Deviation Circle.
Kent and Leitner would compare and contrast the use of standard deviation
circles and standard deviational ellipses in the study of crime science (Kent and Leitner,
2007). The standard deviation circle relied on a regularly distributed dispersion of points
to provide an accurate assessment, but could not account for irregularly distributed data
as the standard deviational ellipse could. In addition, the standard deviational ellipse
was able to display directional data to more accurately analyze the patterns of
commuting type crimes. Although published earlier, Levine would incorporate SDEs into
the analytical methodology of his program, CrimeStat (Levine, 2006). CrimeStat
operates by feeding crime data, namely locations and times of incidents, to produce
visual and statistical data, one of the noted examples being standard deviational
ellipses. Automated programs such as Crimestat are becoming necessary due to the
sheer amount of data that needs to be processed on modern systems.
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Other than crime analysis, standard deviational ellipses have seen prominence in
tracking the spread of disease and immigration. Saxena et al. (2012) used various
statistical methods to track the spread of malaria in India between 2007 and 2009. A
weighted SDE was one of the methods used to display data from other analyses to note
any changing trends and spatial shifting between the years of observation. Similar
processes have been utilized by other malaria studies, such as Eryando, Susanna,
Pratwi, and Nugraha (2012) during their observation in Indonesia, though they added in
environmental factors such as rainfall and temperature. Tenzin, Dhand, Timsina, and
Ward (2010) mapped out occurrences of rabies using SDEs to track the 2008 reemergence of rabies in Bhutan, concluding that the rapid spread was due to the
contribution of stray dogs. Cui and Piracha (2012) utilized SDEs to show the distribution
of both segregation and congregation of ethnicities in Sydney, Australia. They
concluded that different ethnic groups of foreign born residents congregated to certain
parts of Sydney due to factors such as socio-economic conditions and the size of the
communities.
This project will utilize Standard Deviational Ellipses, calculated and created with
the Arcmap 10 software, to spatially analyze terror activities for a nineteen-month
period. Data for the analysis was retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database created
by the University of Maryland, starting in June 2014 and ending in December 2015.
ArcMap 10 will also be used to geocode the data to enable the creation of spatial
means and Standard Deviational Ellipses for each quarter observed.
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CHAPTER III
DATA AND ANALYSIS
Source Data
The dataset used for this project was pulled from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) and contains 2,008 data points. The Global Terrorism Database is a database
maintained by the University of Maryland. Data is collected from open-source media by
the faculty of the University of Maryland, though it is not added to the database until it
has been confirmed to be credible. Inherited from the Pinkerton Global Intelligence
Service in 2001, the database contains data on terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2015, a
total of approximately 150,000 attacks with over 45 variables. The database is noted as
the “most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist events in the world”
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016).
The parameters used to select the data were that the incidents occurred after
June 2014 and that the perpetrator group was ISIL. The data was intended to coincide
with ISIL’s declaration of independence from al-Qaeda. The data consists of the name
of the city and country of occurrence, casualties, weapon type, target type, and date
(See Table 1). No incidents following December 2015 have been added to the GTD as
of the writing of this paper (May 2017). The data retrieved was only for attacks
confirmed to have been carried out by ISIS and its affiliate organizations, excluding
merely “ISIS-inspired” attacks.
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Quarter

Number of Attacks

Fatalities

Injured

Quarter 2 2014 (June)

119

2959

695

Quarter 3 2014 (July-September)

423

3232

1890

Quarter 4 2014 (October-December)

338

2173

1377

Quarter 1 2015 (January-March)

288

1712

1300

Quarter 2 2015 (April-June)

338

2866

1846

Quarter 3 2015 (July-September)

322

2086

2171

Quarter 4 2015 (October-December)

280

1773

2128

Table 1: Summarization of numerical data retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database

Pre-processing
Before analysis could begin, one issue needed to be resolved. The dataset from
the GTD was not geocoded and so had to have latitude and longitude values added
manually. The latitude and longitude values were entered into an Excel spreadsheet
and were used to create a cities shapefile in ArcMap 10, upon which spatial analysis
could be based. Due to the need to examine the data over time, the dataset was split up
into different groups based on the date of the incident. This resulted in seven new
datasets, each representing three month periods. The exception was the first group,
representing only June 2014, which was used as a baseline to compare with
subsequent quarters. Following this, the spreadsheets containing the data from the
GTD were entered into spatial joins with the “cities” shapefile based on the city name to
create the basis of analysis.
The maps used for the later analysis use two different projections due to the
spread of ISIL’s activities from the Middle East. Maps centered on the Middle East are
19

projected using the UTM WGS 1984 38N (See Figures 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22, and
23). The maps showing more of the world are projected with the Robinson World
projection (See Figures 1 and 20).
Spatial Data
Changes in spatial patterns over time were analyzed with the creation of seven
maps, one for each quarter of the year between June 2014 and December 2015. As
ISIL’s attacks began to occur in more countries, the area of observation increased as
well. The attacked cities were displayed with graduated symbols with the larger symbols
representing more attacks in the city indicated.
A spatial mean was created for each map in ArcMap 10, weighted by the number
of attacks per city, resulting in it being placed within one standard deviation of
approximately 68% of all points on the map, though this number varied from map to
map. From there, a weighted Standard Deviational Ellipse was applied to each map to
highlight spatial shifts in both the clustering of attacks and the spatial mean, utilizing the
same parameters. Based on the number of cities and their distribution, the ellipse would
either shrink or grow. The spatial mean and the Standard Deviational Ellipse are used to
express the statistical mean and standard deviation in a visual format for data that is not
normally distributed by averaging the geographical positions of each point against the
spatial mean, using weighting factors to determine importance based on the number of
attacks per city. The ellipse can also indicate physical features of the landscape based
on the orientation. For example, the ellipse for Quarter 2 2014 is northwest to southeast
oriented and nearly matches the direction of the Tigris River, around which most of the
attacks for that quarter have taken place.
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The Standard Deviational Ellipse also shows the distribution of points by the
shape of the ellipse. The closer to being normally distributed the data is, the more
circular the ellipse becomes. If the points are not normally distributed, the ellipse
narrows and lengthens to accommodate the furthest point. In Quarter 4 2015, the Paris
attacks, an extreme outlier, cause the ellipse for that quarter to stretch well beyond the
area the other ellipses cover. Excluding the extreme outlier causes the resulting ellipse
to show the data as being closer to normally distributed.
Spatial Analysis and Results
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is an American think tank founded in
2007 by Dr. Kimberly Kagen as an open source, non-partisan, and non-profit research
organization (Institute for the Study of War, 2007). One of the on-going projects is a
series of maps created by members of the ISW using non-classified and fully
documented information, as well as staff in the field, showing the progression of ISIL’s
territory gains and losses.
On these maps, the colors represent different aspects of analysis. Black
represents territory that ISIL controlled either physically or psychologically. Red
represents territory known to be frequently attacked, but is not controlled by ISIL. Brown
represents regions where ISIL support can be found, but the territory is not controlled by
ISIL. Green represents land controlled by the Kurds. The blue ellipses present on
several of the maps are not Standard Deviational Ellipses, but indicators of changes to
any of the above categories.
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Beginning in June 2014, ISIL controlled (either psychologically or physically)
territory in two countries (See Figure 7) as a result of the Anbar Campaign (Celso,
2015). In Iraq, they controlled most of the northern Tigris river area and a portion of the
Euphrates, which included (but is not limited to) the cities of Mosul, Tall Afar, Tikrit, Abu
Kamal, and Rawah, with additional small pockets to the north and to the west of
Baghdad. In Syria, they held influence over most of the Euphrates River, which included
(but is not limited to) the cities of Manbij, Bab, as-Safirah, at-Tawrah, and ar-Raqqah.
By the end of Quarter 2 2014, ISIL carried out a total of 119 attacks that resulted
in 2959 deaths and 695 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, 2016). The majority of these attacks took place in Iraq
between Mosul and Baghdad, which are displayed with graduated symbols (See Figure
8). The mean center of the attacks was determined to be just west of Tikrit, Iraq, in
between the two largest concentrations of attacks: Mosul and Aythah (See Figure 8).
The standard deviational ellipse covers approximately 350 miles on the x-axis and 250
miles on the y-axis. Of the 41 cities attacked during this time, 28 (70%) were within one
standard deviational ellipse of the mean center (See Figure 8). The ellipse had a
directional orientation of northwest to southeast at approximately 80 degrees clockwise,
to encompass Mosul and Aythah. Due to Quarter 2 2014 encompassing a single month
instead of three, it was only used as a baseline and comparisons of activity between
2014 and 2015 excluded it as an outlier.
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Figure 8: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 2 2014 Attacks
Created by Author on October 31, 2016.
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Figure 9: ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 10, 2014

Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on
September 10, 2014]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-september-10-2014

By September 2014, ISIL had lost control of the road south of Tuz Khurmatu, Iraq
(See Figure 9). Otherwise, they had not gained or lost significant amounts of territory.
The section of northern Iraq denoted by light green represents areas inhabited by the
Kurds, whose armed forces are considered another non-state militia, though one in
opposition of ISIL.
During Quarter 3 2014, ISIL carried out 423 attacks, causing 3232 deaths and
1890 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, 2016). As before, these attacks primarily took place in Iraq, close to the
center of their control. The standard deviational ellipse covers approximately 500 miles
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on the x-axis and 300 miles on the y-axis. Of the 94 cities attacked, 63 (67%) were
within one standard deviational ellipse of the mean center, determined to be just west of
Tikrit. While the mean center was only shifted a few miles southwest, the ellipse was
west to east oriented at approximately 20 degrees clockwise due to several attacks in
Turkey and Egypt (See Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 3 2014 Attacks
Created by Author on October 31, 2016.
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Figure 11: ISIS Sanctuary Map: December 5, 2014

Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on
December 5, 2014]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-december-5-2014

In winter 2014, ISIL’s control territory grew to include Aleppo and the northern
Syrian border, as well as Hit, Iraq (See Figure 11). ISIL lost control of Baiji, but
continued attacks in the area.
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Figure 12: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 4 2014 Attacks
Created by Author on October 31, 2016.
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Over the course of 338 attacks in Quarter 4 2014, there were 2173 deaths and
1377 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, 2016). The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 350 miles on
the x-axis and 150 miles on the y-axis. Of the 75 cities attacked, 50 (67%) were within
one standard deviational ellipse of the mean center. The mean center shifted
approximately fifty miles southwest of Tikrit, Iraq. The resulting ellipse was northwest to
southwest oriented at approximately 45 degrees clockwise (See Figure 12), due to a
lack of activity in Egypt and an increase in activity on the Syria-Turkey border,
specifically in Kobani, Syria.

Figure 13: ISIS Sanctuary Map: March 4, 2015

Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on
March 4, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-march-4-2015
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Between January and March 2015, ISIL gained territory on the Syria-Lebanon
border, though they also lost approximately one-third of their control of the Turkey-Syria
border (See Figure 13).
During Quarter 1 2015, ISIL carried out 288 attacks, causing 1712 deaths and
1846 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, 2016). The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 400 miles on
the x-axis and 300 miles on the y-axis. The mean center of the SDE rests approximately
100 miles southwest of Tikrit, a difference of 50 miles from Quarter 4 2014. Of the 86
cities attacked, 53 (61%) were within one standard deviational ellipse of the mean
center. The resulting ellipse is northwest to southeast oriented at approximately 45
degrees clockwise (See Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 1 2015 Attacks
Created by Author on October 31, 2016.
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Figure 15: ISIS Sanctuary Map: June 19, 2015

Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on
June 19, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/map/isis-sanctuary-june-19-2015

One year after their declaration, ISIL lost control of most of the north Syrian
border remaining after Quarter 1 2015 (See Figure 15). They also made the largest gain
in territory during this time by seizing a significant amount of territory between
Damascus and Deir ez Zeur in Syria as well as south of Damascus.
Over 338 attacks in Quarter 2 2015, ISIL caused 2866 deaths and 1846 injured
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016).
The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 500 miles on the x-axis and 250
miles on the y-axis. The mean center is approximately 75 miles west of Tikrit. Of the 90

32

cities attacked, only 48 (53%) were within one standard deviational ellipse from the
mean center. The SDE is northwest to southeast oriented at approximately 45 degrees
clockwise (See Figure 16).

Figure 16: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 2 2015 Attacks
Created by Author on October 31, 2016.
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Figure 17: ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 15, 2015

Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on
September 15, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/map/isis-sanctuary-map-september-15-2015

By September 2015, ISIL seized the road between ar-Rutbah, Iraq, and the IraqSyria border (See Figure 17). They also secured and expanded their hold on the road
between Mosul and Hawija.
ISIL carried out 323 attacks in Quarter 3 2015, in which 2086 people were killed
and 2171 were injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism, 2016). The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 450 miles
on the x-axis and 250 miles on the y-axis. The mean center was 100 miles west of
Tikrit. Of the 77 cities attacked, 47 (61%) were within one standard deviational ellipse of
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the mean center. The ellipse was northwest to southwest oriented at 45 degrees
clockwise (See Figure 18).
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Figure 18: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 3 2015 Attacks
Created by Author on October 31, 2016.
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Figure 19: ISIS Sanctuary Map: December 21, 2015

Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on
December 21, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/map/isis-sanctuary-december-21-2015

By December 2015, ISIL lost control of Sinjar and the surrounding region while
making no significant gains (See Figure 19). During Quarter 4 2015, ISIL performed 280
attacks, killing 1773 people and injuring 2128 (National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). For the first time, ISIL struck outside of
the Middle East with attacks in France and Tunisia. The resulting standard deviational
ellipse covered 1350 miles on the x-axis and 225 miles on the y-axis. The mean center
was 170 miles west of Tikrit. Of the 74 cities attacked, 53 (71%) were within one
standard deviational ellipse of the mean center. The standard deviational ellipse was
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northwest to southeast oriented at 30 degrees clockwise (See Figure 20). The extreme
difference between the Quarter 3 2015 SDE and the Quarter 4 2015 SDE can be
attributed to the presence of several extreme outliers: the Paris and Tunis City attacks.
Excluding the extreme outliers resulted in a more normally-shaped ellipse that covered
500 miles on the x-axis and 250 miles on the y-axis. The mean center was estimated to
be 50 miles southwest of Tikrit. The ellipse contained only 39 (54%) of the 72 cities
attacked during that quarter (See Figure 21).
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Figure 20: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 4 2015 Attacks
Created by Author on October 31, 2016.
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Figure 21: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 4 2015 Attacks Excluding Extreme Outliers
Created by Author on November 30, 2016.
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Overall, the mean center of attacks from 2014 to 2015 has shifted approximately
125 miles west (See Figure 22). However, the exclusion of the extreme outliers in
France and Tunisia caused the mean center of Quarter 4 2015 to shift southeast of its
original position, resulting in a net shift of 35 miles southwest from 2014 to 2015 (See
Figure 23). The Standard Deviational Ellipses shifted from north to south oriented to
west to east oriented. The Quarter 2 2014 ellipse (See Figure 8) matched the Tigris
River due to most of ISIL’s attacks during that period occurring in cities on the banks of
the river. The ellipses of subsequent quarters were oriented to match the Euphrates
River due to both an increase in activity in cities along the river and countries to the
south and west of Iraq and Syria.
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Figure 22: Standard Deviational Ellipses and Mean Centers 2014-2015
Created by Author on November 28, 2016.
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Figure 23: Standard Deviational Ellipses and Mean Centers 2014-2015 With Exclusion of Outliers
Created by Author on December 5, 2016.
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Figure 6: June 2014

Figure 7: September 2014

Figure 8: December 2014

Figure 9: March 2015

Figure 10: June 2015

Figure 11: September 2015

Figure 13: December 2015
Figure 24: ISIL Territory Change Overview
Compiled by Author on April 26, 2017.
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Figure 13: Quarter 2 2014

Figure 14: Quarter 3 2014

Figure 15: Quarter 4 2014

Figure 16: Quarter 1 2015

Figure 17: Quarter 2 2015

Figure 18: Quarter 3 2015

Figure 20: Quarter 4 2015
Figure 25: ISIL Attack Overview
Compiled by Author on April 26, 2017.

Looking at the overviews of both the territory changes (See Figure 24) and the
attacks carried out by ISIL (See Figure 25) shows that, though ISIL gradually shifted its
power base into Syria, the majority of their activities continued to take place in Iraq.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The largest land gain (See Figure 13) and second highest number of attacks
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016)
were during Quarter 2 2015 when ISIL seized territory to the northeast and southeast of
Damascus, Syria. The territorial losses of the previous quarter, which included a
significant amount of the Syria-Turkey border and was the largest loss of the seven
quarters (See Figure 11), seem to correlate with the increase in attacks that occurred
during Quarter 2 2015 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism, 2016). However, Quarter 3 2014, which saw little to no territorial gains
(See Figure 9), had the highest number of attacks and the most damage caused
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016).
The increase could be attributed to fervor generated by al-Baghdadi’s announcement in
June 2014, with the intent of the attacks being on causing damage rather than seizing
land.
The mean center for each map shifted west as more attacks occurred outside of
Iraq and Syria, though due to the concentration of attacks on cities near the Tigris River,
it did not move very far (See Figure 25). The points were relatively normally distributed,
though the Standard Deviational ellipses grew on the x-axis and y-axis to accommodate
more points. The exception to this is Quarter 4 2015 (See Figure 20), where ISIL made
its first attacks outside of the Middle East.
With the exclusion of Quarter 2 2014 and the extreme outliers from Quarter 4
2015, the majority of the data show very little geographical changes (See Figure 23).
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Despite increasing numbers of attacks by ISIL-inspired perpetrators, the majority of ISIL
attacks remain in Iraq and Syria (See Figure 24 and 25). While the directional
orientation of the Standard Deviational Ellipses may change, the sizes of the SDEs
remain close (See Table 2).
Quarter

X-Axis

Y-Axis

(In Miles)

(In Miles)

Quarter 2 2014

350

250

Quarter 3 2014

500

300

Quarter 4 2014

350

150

Quarter 1 2015

400

300

Quarter 2 2015

500

250

Quarter 3 2015

450

250

Quarter 4 2015*

500

250

Asterisk Indicates Exclusion of Outliers
Table 2: Approximate Dimensions of SDEs per Quarter (In Miles)

While the data from the Global Terrorism Database ends at December 2015 as
of the writing of this paper (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, 2016), ISIL has continued to spread its influence. Media
sources report more attacks outside of the Middle East, such as the attack in Brussels,
Belgium on March 22, 2016. There have also been reports of attacks in east Asia, such
as Indonesia and the Phillipines (Lister et al., 2016). While many of the attacks reported
are actually committed by ISIL, attacks committed by “ISIS-inspired” terrorists are
reported with them. ISIL’s controlled territory has almost completely shifted into Syria.
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Figure 26: ISIS Sanctuary Map: December 8, 2016
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on December
8, 2016]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-december-8-2016

Despite ISIL’s now seemingly longer reach, their territory inside of the Middle
East has been reduced significantly since December 2015 (See Figure 13). As of
December 2016 (See Figure 26), the only pieces of territory ISIL controls inside of Iraq
are Mosul, Hawaji, and Qaim, with their power base having almost completely shifted
into Syria. These pieces of information suggest a correlation between loss of territory
and potential range of operation. A concern has come up over the current fighting over
Mosul: If Mosul is lost, will surviving ISIL operatives begin striking out at Europe (Meyer
& Nichols, 2016) as foreign fighters return home? This concern is also applicable to the
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territories in Syria, as once their centralized power is gone where will the fighters go?
Based on the data used for this paper and subsequent developments in 2016, ISIL is
not quite the global threat that many fear it to be. While certainly dangerous, their
activities have been limited in scope and decreasingly effective, at least in regards to
their stated goal.
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Appendix A: Office of Research Integrity Approval Letter
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